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TORTS-CAUSES OF ACTION EXIST FOR NEGLIGENCE, IN-
TENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND 
FRAUD FOR TRANSMISSION OF A SEXUALLY COMMUNICA-
BLE DISEASE BETWEEN UNMARRIED PARTNERS. B.N. v. 
K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) have existed for thousands of 
years. Biblical accounts describe venereal diseases akin to the herpes 
simplex virus, and a herpes epidemic during the Roman Empire is well 
documented. I Within the last thirty years, however, changing attitudes 
and sexual behavior have resulted in a considerable increase in the 
number of reported cases of STDs.2 
Two of the most widespread STDs in the nation today are the 
herpes simplex virus (HSV)3 and acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
1. Willcox, Venereal Disease in the Bible, 25 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASE 28 (March 
1949); see also Leo, The New Scarlet Letter, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982 at 62. 
2. Especially between 1966 and 1984, the number of reported cases of genital herpes 
rose dramatically. Data collected by random sample of private physicians in the 
United States indicates that, during that period, consultations for genital herpes in-
creased almost fifteen-fold from 29,560 to 450,570. Genital Herpes Infection -
United States, 1966-1984,35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 402 (June 
20, 1986) [hereinafter MMWR Genital Herpes Infection in the u.s.]. From 1980 to 
1984 alone, physician-patient consultations rose two-fold from less than 225,000 in 
1980 to 450,570 in 1984, and it is estimated that there are approximately 500,000 
new cases of genital herpes each year. Id. See also Wheeler, The Herpes Simplex 
Problem, 18 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOL. 163-64 (1988). 
Likewise, the incidence of individuals infected with the acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome (AIDS) virus has reached epidemic proportions in the United 
States. According to figures released by the Centers for Disease Control, the 
number of persons testing positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in 
the United States as of November 30,1989 totaled 115,158. Ofthis number, 68,441 
have died. Center for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Monthly Report 
(Dec. 1989). Notwithstanding the number of reported cases of HIV infection, it is 
estimated that between 945,000 and 1,400,000 people are infected with HIV nation-
wide. Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A Review of 
Current Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 342, 356 (Dec. 
18, 1987) [hereinafter MMWR HIV Infection in the U.S.]. In addition, it is esti-
mated that for every person who has developed symptoms of AIDS, there are 50 to 
100 people who are asymptomatic but HIV positive. See Legal, Medical and Gov-
ernmental Perspectives on AIDS as a Disability, 1987 A.B.A. Commission on the 
Mentally Disabled Rep. 
In Maryland, 2011 individuals have been reported as infected with AIDS as of 
September 30, 1989. Of that number, 1202 individuals have died. The epidemic 
proportion of this disease can best be recognized by considering that as of December 
31, 1988, 1491 persons tested positive for the HIV. Compare Maryland AIDS Up-
date (Sept. 30, 1989) with Maryland AIDS Update (Dec. 31, 1988). 
3. Herpes simplex is a highly contagious and incurable disease that most frequently 
affects the mucous membrane areas of the human body. There are two subtypes of 
the herpes simplex. virus: HSV-l and HSV-2. Although both types can cause facial 
and genital infection, "[g]enital HSV-2 infection is twice as likely to be reactivated 
and recurs 8 to 10 times more frequently than genital HSV-l infection." Corey & 
Spear, Infection with Herpes Simplex Viruses, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (Mar. 20, 
1986). Other strains of the herpes virus not classified as "simplex" include herpes 
encephalitis (inflammation of the brain), herpes keratitis (inflammation of the cor-
nea), and herpes zoster (shingles). 2 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF 
MEDICINE (MB), at H-81 to H-82 (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
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(AIDS).4 Both the public and private sectors have launched intensive 
efforts at the state and national levels to educate the public to the dangers 
of these diseases and the methods of curbing their spread. 5 The question 
remains, however, what effect increased awareness, without additional 
measures, will have on the spread of these devastating diseases. 6 
What is clear from the number of reported cases of STDs and the 
efforts to educate the public is that individuals must reevaluate their sex-
ual practices. Today, courts more frequently are defining the limits of 
acceptable sexual behavior. Judicial imposition of fault and the corre-
sponding formulation of a legal remedy can further social policies, thus 
providing individuals with a means of redress, and, at the same time, 
deterring negligent or reckless conduct. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land's holding in B.N. v. K.K.7 provides a remedy to persons who con-
tract sexually transmitted diseases due to the irresponsible sexual 
behavior of others. 
Imposition of tort liability for transmission of contagious diseases, 
while relatively new to Maryland, has existed for over a century in other 
jurisdictions.8 Infected plaintiffs have recovered under various theories 
including negligence,9 intentional infliction of emotional distress, 10 
4. Although the exact etiology of AIDS is unknown, scientists recognize that AIDS is 
caused by a retrovirus known as HIV, which attacks a person's immune system and 
weakens or destroys his ability to ward off disease. It is for this reason that those 
afflicted with AIDS contract rare diseases such as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, 
which is the most common cause of death in AIDS patients. See generally Fried-
land, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: General Overview, 32 INT'L J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 677 (1987)[hereinafter Friedland, AIDS: General Overview]. The 
three most common means of contracting the HIV are homosexual activity, the 
sharing of contaminated hypodermic needles by intravenous drug users, and blood 
transfusion. See generally MMWR HIV Infection in the U.S., supra note 2, at 342-
44; see also infra note 89. 
5. In 1988 the u.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) sent a brochure 
to every household in the United States in an effort to educate the public about the 
nature and effect of AIDS and the means for its prevention and control. See Under-
standing AIDS, HHS Pub. No. 88-8404 (1988) [hereinafter Understanding AIDS]. 
6. Results of a 1982 random telephone survey of 2363 people conducted for ABC 
News and The Washington Post indicate that not only are people more aware of the 
recent increase in STDs, but also that they are changing their sexual behavior as a 
result. Aral, Cates & Jenkins, Genital Herpes: Does Knowledge Lead to Action?, 75 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 69 (1985). 
7. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
8. Infection with non-sexually transmitted disease often was the basis of liability. See, 
e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) (tuberculosis); Skillings 
v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (scarlet fever); Hendricks v. Butcher, 
144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910) (smallpox); Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 
69 N.W. 67 (1896) (typhoid fever). 
9. Several courts have imposed liability on a negligence theory. See, e.g., Duke v. 
Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.) ("One who negligently exposes another to an 
infectious or contagious disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be 
held liable in damages for his actions.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
863 (1979). Negligence served as an alternate basis of liability in Crowell v. Crow-
ell, 180 N.C. 516, 519, 105 S.E. 206, 208 (1920) ("[A]side from the question of 
assault, it is a well-settled proposition of law that a person is liable if he negligently 
1989] B.N. v. K.K. 615 
fraud,1l and assault or battery.12 
A cause of action in negligence is based upon the existence of a duty, 
breach of that duty, causation-both factual and legal-and damage. 13 
In the context of a sexually transmitted disease case, the existence of a 
duty is defined by the ability of the person knowingly infected with the 
disease to foresee that his partner may become infected as a result of his 
act or omission. 14 The relationship between partners to an intimate sex-
ual encounter, and the interest of the state in protecting its citizens from 
the spread of STDs, also gives rise to a duty on the part of one knowingly 
infected with an STD to abstain from sexual relations, or to advise an 
intimate partner of the risk of contracting the disease. IS 
exposes another to a contagious or infectious disease.") (citing Skillings v. Allen, 
143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919». 
10. During the last two decades, an increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. ATLA L. REP. 203-07 (June 
1988). The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized this cause of action in Harris 
v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). See also infra notes 26-29 and accom-
panying text. More recently, this tort has served as a basis for liability in suits 
involving sexually transmitted disease. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 
3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). 
11. De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (defendant infected plaintiff 
with crab lice after obtaining plaintiff's consent to have sexual intercourse upon a 
fraudulent promise of marriage). 
12. Cromwell, 180 N.C. at 520, 105 S.E. at 209. Assault or battery has also served as a 
basis for criminal liability. See, e.g., State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 
A. 63 (1917) (husband guilty of assault and battery for transmitting syphilis to his 
wife). 
13. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
14. See Kathleen K, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 995-96, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 275; see also Com-
ment, AIDS - Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmission, 18 CUMBo L. REV. 691, 
707 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, AIDS Transmission]; Comment, You Wouldn't 
Give Me Anything, Would You? Tort Liability for Genital Herpes, 20 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 60, 65 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Tort Liabilityfor Herpes]. Because of the 
highly contagious nature of STDs such as herpes and AIDS, the foreseeability of 
injury may extend to innocent third parties such as spouses and unborn fetuses. See 
Mussirand v. David, 45 Ohio St. 3d 314, 544 N.E.2d 265,272 (1989) ("If one negli-
gently exposes a married person to a sexually transmitable disease without inform-
ing that person of his exposure, it is reasonable to anticipate that the disease may be 
transmitted to the married person's spouse."). For a general discussion o( third 
party actions, see Comment, The Consequences of an Uninformed Menage A Trois 
Extraordinaire: Liability to Third Parties for the Nondisclosure of Genital Herpes 
Between Sexual Partners, 29 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 787, 808-10 [hereinafter Comment, 
Herpes: Liability to Third Parties]. 
15. R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). A duty to dis-
close one's infected condition may exist even when the disease is in a latent or 
asymptomatic state. Although some studies suggest that genital herpes can be 
transmitted only during active outbreaks of the disease (i.e., open, oozing sores), 
other studies suggest that genital herpes can be transmitted at times when the dis-
ease is neither visible nor producing symptoms. Compare W. WICKETT, HERPES: 
CAUSE AND CONTROL 17 (1982) with Wheeler, The Herpes Simplex Problem, J. 
AM. ACAD. DERMATOL. 163, 165 (Jan. 1988); see also Mertz & Corey, Genital 
Herpes Simplex Virus Infections in Adults, in UROLOGIC CLINICS OF NORTH 
AMERICA: SYMPOSIUM ON SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE III (R. Berger, 
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To constitute a breach of duty in a negligence action for transmis-
sion of an STD, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or 
should have known he was infected with an STD and that he either failed 
to abstain from conduct likely to transmit the disease, or, at the very 
least, failed to inform the plaintiff of the risk of contracting the disease. 16 
The third, and arguably most difficult, element a plaintiff to a negli-
gence action must prove is that the defendant's act or failure to act was 
the proximate cause of the injury sustained. 17 Two separate, but related 
causes must be proved: factual cause and legal cause. IS 
In the context of STDs, the plaintiff's infection will likely be linked 
to some type of sexual contact. 19 Therefore, a plaintiff in a monogamous 
relationship can easily prove that "but for" the defendant's negligence in 
failing to recognize and disclose the nature of his infection, the plaintiff 
would never have contracted the disease.2o 
Legal causation is often defined by the defendant's ability to foresee 
adverse effects of his act or omission.21 The levels of foreseeability will 
differ depending on the status of the defendant. If, for example, the de-
fendant experiences recurrent outbreaks of herpes, the extent of foresee-
ability is broad. If, however, the defendant is unaware of his condition, 
or, unaware that his paramour is involved in other promiscuous relation-
M.D., ed. 1984). Consequently, notwithstanding whether a person believes or has 
been advised that he is incapable of transmitting the disease, he may have a duty to 
disclose his condition at all times. Comment, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Trans-
mission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 121 
(1984) [hereinafter Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law]; see also infra note 31. 
16. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 164. 
17. Id. at 165. 
18. Id. at 263-80; see also Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 22 Md. App. 673, 689-90, 325 
A.2d 432, 441-42 (1974). 
19. The transmission of AIDS, unlike that of other STDs, often occurs without any 
physical contact whatsoever. Nonetheless, the plaintiff may sufficiently satisfy the 
factual cause element. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
20. Problems may arise, however, when the plaintiff has had sexual relations with two 
or more partners. In such a case, the plaintiff will bear the additional burden of 
proving that the sexual conduct of the defendant was the cause of transmission of 
the disease. Consequently, a plaintiff must inquire into the medical conditions of all 
partners during the approximate time of the initial outbreak. 
Given the epidemic proportion of individuals infected with STDs, see supra 
note 2, it is possible that a plaintiff's inquiry will result in a finding that more than 
one partner was infected with the same disease. In such an event, traditional tort 
law concepts will not deem the plaintiff incapable of recovery merely because the 
true tortfeasor cannot be identified with particularity. Maharam v. Maharam, 123 
A.D.2d 165, 171, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108 (1986), Instead, the burden will shift to 
the defendants to prove that their actions were not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's 
injury. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d I (1948). 
Medical advances in DNA fingerprinting may provide a plaintiff with the abil-
ity to identify with particularity the partner who transmitted the infection at issue, 
whether it be herpes or AIDS. See Comment, Herpes: Liability to Third Parties, 
supra note 14, at 809-10. 
21. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter 
PROSSER ON TORTS)' 
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ships and the infection originating from the defendant is transmitted to 
others, the foreseeability is very low and may negate liability. 22 
The final element of a prima facie negligence action is proof that the 
plaintiff sustained actual injury or damage.23 A showing that the plaintiff 
is infected with an STD is sufficient to satisfy the injury element of the 
tort. 24 
Upon proof of both the defendant's intentional or reckless nondis-
closure of the presence of an STD and the plaintiff's subsequent infec-
tion, the plaintiff may recover under one or more causes of action for 
intentional tort. All intentional torts require that the plaintiff prove the 
defendant had actual knowledge that his act or omission would result in 
harm.25 
Within the last fifteen years, Maryland has expressly recognized the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 26 The plaintiff must 
prove four elements: (1) the defendant's conduct must be intentional or 
reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous;27 (3) there 
must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emo-
tional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe.28 Recovery 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress normally is limited to inju-
ries which involve no physical contact between the parties. Courts recog-
nize, however, the validity of such an action in the context of STDs.29 
22. The participation of the defendant's paramour in promiscuous relations with third 
parties is a supervening act that may relieve the defendant of liability. See Restate· 
ment (Second) of Torts § 441 (1965). For a comprehensive discussion of third party 
issues arising from the transmission of venereal diseases, see Comment, Herpes: Li-
ability to Third Parties, supra note 14, at 801. 
23. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 165. 
24. Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 540, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985). 
25. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 36. For this reason, a plaintiff may desire to 
bring an alternative claim for negligence to avoid the possibility of not meeting the 
burden of proving the defendant's intent to harm or his actual or imputed knowl-
edge of the contagious nature of the infection. Under a negligence theory, the plain-
tiff need only prove that a reasonable person, similarly situated, would have 
recognized both the existence and possibility of transmitting the disease. See Brown 
v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 497, 204 A.2d 526, 530-31 (1964); see also infra note 31. 
26. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977). 
27. The court will make an initial determination whether the alleged acts constitute 
extreme and outrageous conduct. Upon an affirmative finding, the court will submit 
the case to the jury to determine whether to impose liability. [d. at 569, 380 A. 2d 
at 615. 
28. [d. at 566,380 A.2d at 614 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 
145 (1974)). 
29. Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 (1985); Kathleen K. v. Robert 
B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984). At least one 
commentator has recognized an inconsistency in permitting claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress for genital herpes transmission. His rationale for 
denying such an action is based on the clear presence of physical contact in STD 
cases. See Note, Kathleen K. v. Robert B.: A Cause of Action for Genital Herpes 
Transmission, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 498, 518 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Genital 
Herpes Transmission]. Instead, the author suggests, as does comment b to § 46 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that "emotional distress is more properly an item 
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To state a claim for fraud in Maryland, the plaintiff must allege the 
following five elements: (1) that a representation made by the defendant 
was false; (2) that either the falsity of such representation was known to 
the defendant or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless in-
difference to the truth as to impute such knowledge to him; (3) that the 
misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff; 
(4) that the plaintiff not only relied upon the misrepresentation, but also 
had the right to rely upon it with full belief of its truth, and that he 
would not have done the thing from which damage resulted if the mis-
representation had not been made; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered dam-
age directly resulting from the misrepresentation. 30 
Three forms of fraudulent misrepresentation exist in the context of 
liability for transmission of an STD.31 First, the transmitter may offer an 
intentional, affirmative representation that he is free from disease, know-
ing that he is infected.32 Second, the transmitter may offer a negligent, 
affirmative misrepresentation, such as when a person, who has exper-
ienced symptoms that should put him on notice that he is diseased, in-
of damages flowing from the injury itself." Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, 
supra at 518-19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment b 
(1965». 
30. See Suburban Properties Mgmt, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 204 A.2d 326, 
329 (1964). Although courts traditionally have limited the tort of misrepresentation 
to commercial settings, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 comment h 
(1977), there are a limited number of cases imposing liability for fraud resulting in 
physical injury to an innocent victim in a noncommercial setting. See, e.g., 
Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986) (recognizing 
wife's claim for fraud against husband who had infected her with herpes); Kathleen 
K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992,994, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (1984) (similar); 
see also 31 ATLA L. REP. 203, 206 (June 1988); Comment, Genital Herpes and the 
Law, supra note 15, at 130-32. 
31. An essential element of fraudulent misrepresentation is scienter on the part of the 
defendant. This requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's SUbjective intent 
was to mislead the plaintiff through a representation the defendant knew to be false. 
Proof of actual intent to deceive is paramount. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, 
at 741. Regarding scienter, it is unclear whether an intention to mislead for the 
establishment of scienter includes a partner's representation based upon an uncer-
tain belief that he is free from disease. Some courts have found the scienter element 
satisfied when a defendant asserts a fact which he has no knowledge to believe is 
true. Harris v. Delco Products Co., 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.ld 740 (1940); see gener-
ally Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REV. 583, 
592-93 (1958). 
When the plaintiff is lacking sufficient facts to establish the defendant's intent 
to deceive, an alternative theory of recovery may be found in a cause of action for 
negligent misrepresentation. Hence, a defendant, who honestly but erroneously be-
lieves himself to be free from disease, and who infects an innocent victim who relied 
on his representation, will be deemed negligent if he failed to exercise reasonable 
care in ascertaining the facts relied on in making his representation. See Alice D. v. 
William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1982). For a comprehensive 
discussion of deceit and negligent misrepresentation, see Note, Genital Herpes 
Transmission, supra note 29, at 519-29. 
32. Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274, involved such an 
affirmative misrepresentation of fact. 
1989] B.N. v. K.K. 619 
forms a partner that he is free of disease.33 Finally, the transmitter may 
offer no information whatsoever to a partner regarding his infection, 
when, in fact, he knew of his infected condition. 34 
The leading case in the area of tort liability for the sexual transmis-
sion of disease is Kathleen K. v. Robert B. 35 In that case, the plaintiff 
stated viable causes of action sounding in negligence, battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and fraud against a defendant who in-
fected her with genital herpes.36 In reaching its decision, the California 
Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning of a prior California Court of 
Appeals ruling, Barbara A. v. John G., 37 in which the court held that a 
plaintiff who seeks damages for severe injury to his own body may state a 
valid cause of action against the person who caused the injury.38 
The Kathleen K. court dismissed the precedential value of Stephen 
K v. Ron; L. ,39 in which the court refused to "encourage unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to 
privacy [by] supervis[ing] the promises made between two consenting 
adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct."40 
In distinguishing the court of appeals' holding in Stephen K., the 
Kathleen K court noted that the policy concerns at issue in a "wrongful 
birth" action (such as Stephen K.) involve the birth of a healthy child, 
where no physical injury is sustained by either parent.41 Thus, the court 
expanded its prior holding in Barbara A. by recognizing all four of Kath-
leen K.'s causes of action. Since the decision in Kathleen K., a flurry of 
suits have been instituted upon similar legal theories for the transmission 
of STDs, and appellate courts entertaining such claims have consistently 
ruled in the plaintiffs' favor. 42 
33. Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29 at 522·23. If the transmitter has 
made an affirmative misrepresentation that he is free from disease, the plaintiff may 
plead in the alternative that the defendant acted either intentionally or negligently, 
allowing the trier of fact to determine the truth of such allegations. Id. See also 
supra notes 25 & 31. 
34. See, e.g., Maharam, 123 A.D.2d at 170, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107. In this case, the wife 
made out a claim for actionable fraud against her husband, who had infected her 
with herpes after concealing that he had the disease. The court concluded that the 
marital relationship imposed a duty upon the husband to alert his wife that he was 
infected with the disease. Id. See also Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra 
note 29, at 523·29. 
35. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). 
36. /d. at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274. The California court provided few facts in its 
opinion, noting only that the plaintiff contracted genital herpes by way of sexual 
intercourse with the defendant. Id. at 993-94, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274. 
37. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). 
38. Id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276. 
39. 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980). 
40. Id. at 644-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620. 
41. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 275. 
42. See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Maharam v. 
Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 519 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); S.A.V. v. 
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (en bane); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 
333 S.E.2d 852 (1985). 
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In B.N. v. K.K. ,43 the plaintiff, Ms. N., was employed as a nurse at 
Johns Hopkins University Hospital. For four months, Ms. N. was in-
volved in an intimate relationship with the defendant, Dr. K., a physician 
at the hospital. During their relationship, the couple engaged in sexual 
intercourse at a time when Dr. K. knew he was experiencing an active 
outbreak of genital herpes. Ms. N. neither was aware of Dr. K.'s condi-
tion, nor did she have any reason to suspect that he was infected with the 
herpes virus.44 As a result of their sexual contact, Ms. N. contracted 
genital herpes.45 
On a question certified by the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland,46 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, 
upon a proper factual showing, Maryland recognizes causes of action for 
negligence, for fraud, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
arising from the sexual transmission of a dangerous, contagious, and in-
curable disease such as genital herpes.47 
The court of appeals, in recognizing Ms. No's actions for negligence, 
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, noted that tradi-
tional tort and criminal law concepts frequently have been applied to 
impose liability for transmission of contagious diseases.48 
The court addressed each of the three causes of action individually. 
Its discussion of negligence focused on the transmitter's duty and on 
foreseeability.49 The court concluded that everyone bears the responsi-
bility to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others. 50 
43. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
44. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
45. /d. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
46. The issues presented by the plaintiff's complaint were certified pursuant to the 
Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1984). The certified question was: "Does Maryland 
Recognize A Cause of Action for Either Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, Or Negligence Resulting From the Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous, 
Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes?" 312 Md. at 137-38, 
538 A.2d at 1176. All facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint were assumed suffi-
cient for the purpose of ruling on the certified question. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 
1177. 
47. Id., 538 A.2d at 1176. The plaintiff's complaint contained four counts: fraud, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and assault and battery. Id. at 
139, 538 A.2d at 1177. Because of a limitations problem, the plaintiff's assault and 
battery count was not before the court of appeals. Id. at 139 n.I, 538 A.2d at 1177 
n.l. Moreover, the court entertained the causes of action in a different order than 
they were presented for consideration. The reason for this, apparently, was the 
court's need to establish the duty element for the plaintiff's fraud count. Survey, 
Developments in Maryland Law, 1987-88: Torts, 48 MD. L. REV. 844, 848 n.50 
(1989); see also supra note 46. 
48. 312 Md. at 139, 538 A.2d at 1177. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (S.D.N. Y. 
1884) (whooping cough); Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 
(1910) (smallpox); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) 
(tuberculosis). 
49. 312 Md. at 141-42, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
50. /d. at 141,538 A.2d at 1178; see also Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 
11, 15 (1975). 
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In defining the duty owed to the plaintiff, the court relied on the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 435(2), which defines the realm of legal causa-
tion. 51 Thus, liability would attach only "if it appears highly likely that 
the conduct in question should have brought about the harm."52 Liabil-
ity would not attach, however, if "it appears 'highly extraordinary' that 
the negligent conduct should have brought about the harm."53 
The application of negligence concepts to a sexual transmission situ-
ation implies that a person infected with a disease such as genital herpes 
has a duty to disclose his illness to all who are likely to be injured. As 
the court of appeals stated, "the infected person has a duty to take rea-
sonable precautions-whether by warning others or by avoiding contact 
with them-to avoid transmitting the disease."54 In the context of sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, liability rests in the transmitter's duty to exer-
cise due care so as not to injure another. 55 Accordingly, for a court to 
find a defendant liable for transmission of a sexually communicable dis-
ease, the defendant, at very least, must recognize that he is diseased in 
some manner. 56 In the absence of such knowledge, or, in the absence of a 
reason on the part of the transmitter to know of his infection, liability 
would not attach. 57 
51. That section of the Restatement provides: "The actor's conduct may be held not to 
be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the 
harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary 
that it should have brought about the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 435(2) (1965). 
52. 312 Md. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
53. Id. at 141-42, 538 A.2d at 1178 (quoting Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 
Md. 320, 334, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)). 
54. Id. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
55. See Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 513. 
56. Id. at 514; see also Cook v. Cook, 32 N.J. Eq. 475, 480 (1880). 
57. People are presumed, however, to have a basic level of knowledge or common sense. 
See Note, Negligence-Knowledge-Minimum Standard 0/ Knowledge-Duty to 
Know, 23 MINN. L. REV. 628, 633-37 (1939). Thus, if a defendant has open, oozing 
genital sores, he should be deemed to possess the requisite knowledge, whether or 
not he is aware that it is genital herpes. Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra, 
note 29, at 514-15. 
In C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Ap-
peals of Minnesota dealt with a cause of action for negligent transmission of the 
AIDS virus by a man who allegedly had engaged in homosexual activity. The 
defendant's 
knowledge only consisted of what he perceived at the time of [his] rela-
tionship [with the plaintiff], coupled with his memory and experience, con-
cerning the transmission of AIDS. It is required only that [the 
defendant's] perception be reasonable under the circumstances, and he is 
not expected to perceive what is not apparent. 
[d. at 443. Looking at the information available to the general public at the time the 
parties ended their sexual contact, the spring of 1985, the court determined that it 
was not reasonable for the defendant to have constructive knowledge that he might 
have AIDS or was capable of transmitting the disease to his fiancee. [d. at 444. In 
the spring of 1985, the local news indicated only that (I) few persons in Minnesota 
had contracted AIDS, (2) AIDS was associated primarily with homosexuals and 
intraveneous drug users, and (3) there was a belief that AIDS was transmitted 
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In addressing Ms. N.'s negligence count, the court noted that Ms. 
N. was a "clearly identified potential victim" of Dr. K.'s infection.58 Ms. 
N. alleged that Dr. K., knowing he had active herpes-a highly conta-
gious, sexually transmitted disease-had sexual intercourse with her. 59 
Thus, Dr. K. owed a duty to Ms. N.60 
Ms. N.'s complaint sufficiently established that Dr. K. breached his 
duty to her by infecting her with a serious, painful, and incurable disease 
while having knowledge that the disease was active and in a highly conta-
gious state.61 The court held that Ms. N. stated a cause of action in 
negligence under Maryland law because she alleged facts showing that 
Dr. K. owed her a duty to take reasonable precautions,62 that Dr. K. 
breached that duty by failing to warn Ms. N. of his condition, and that 
Ms. N. contracted genital herpes which was proximately caused by Dr. 
K.'s failure to warn or take precautions. 63 
The court of appeals next addressed the viability of Ms. N.'s action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.64 After stating the ele-
ments of that tort,65 the court applied the facts alleged by Ms. N. to those 
elements. Because Dr. K. knew he had active herpes, recognized the 
dangerous, contagious, and incurable nature of the disease, and engaged 
in sexual intercourse with Ms. N., the court of appeals deemed his con-
duct intentional or reckless. 66 
After considering the characteristics of genital herpes,67 the court 
easily concluded that transmission of the disease was substantially cer-
through blood or semen. Furthermore, there was no publicly available AIDS test. 
Id. Presumably, the court would not reach the same conclusion today given the 
manner in which the public has been inundated with information about AIDS and 
its transmission. See supra notes 5-6. 
58. 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
59. Id. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
62. It is unclear from the court's holding in B.N. when such a legal duty on the part of 
one infected with an STD actually arises. In the case of genital herpes, the duty 
may arise only when it is active, and thus transmittable. But see infra note 15. In 
the case of AIDS, however, the duty to disclose may always be present simply be-
cause the disease is transmittable even when there is no manifestation of physical 
symptoms. Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 5. 
63. 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. For a comprehensive listing of law review com-
mentaries discussing the applicability of negligence principles to the transmission of 
genital herpes, see id. at 143-44, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
64. Id. at 144-49, 538 A.2d at 1179-82. 
65. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text. 
66. 312 Md. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1180. Because the facts presented by Ms. N. irrefuta-
bly established scienter on the part of Dr. K, it was not difficult for the court to find 
the facts alleged sufficient to establish fraud. In the future, courts will confront the 
more difficult burden of defining the bounds of negligent misrepresentations in the 
STD context. See supra note 31. 
67. The court noted that: "Genital herpes is a contagious, painful, and incurable dis-
ease that is spread by sexual contact. It is an infectious disease that endangers pub-
lic health." 312 Md. at 139-41, 538 A.2d at 1177-78; see also supra notes 2-3. 
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tain to produce severe emotional distress68 and that Dr. K.'s conduct 
was extreme and outrageous.69 The court also noted that if the facts of 
Ms. N.'s complaint could be established as alleged, then "[t]he causal 
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress is 
apparent .... "70 
Although the court relied on cases from other jurisdictions to sup-
port a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,'! it 
emphasized that a plaintiff may recover only upon a showing that severe 
emotional distress resulted.'2 Nonetheless, by stating that "[t]he nature 
of the conduct itself may provide evidence of the severity of the dis-
tress,"73 the court allows the trier of fact to analyze the defendant's con-
duct in addition to the plaintiff's injury. Giving B.N. v. KK. a broad 
reading, one can conclude that the court has eliminated the severity ele-
ment of the tort in favor of a consideration of the objective physical con-
dition, rather than the SUbjective mental state, of the plaintiff. 74 
The court of appeals next addressed the viability of Ms. N.'s cause 
of action for fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation,7S and noted 
that liability may exist for physical harm caused by a fraudulent misrep-
resentation.'6 Ms. N. alleged that Dr. K. concealed the existence of geni-
tal herpes, rather than asserting that he was free from disease. The court 
then determined whether Dr. K. had a duty to inform Ms. N. of his 
68. The court noted, however, that emotional distress need not produce total physical 
or emotional disablement to be severe. Id. at 148, 538 A.2d at 1181. Not only had 
Ms. N. alleged the painful and incurable aspects of genital herpes, but the court sua 
sponte added that: 
[The disease] is associated with the development of cervical cancer, with 
the dangers of miscarriage and premature delivery during childbirth, and 
with a high mortality rate for children, born of mothers who have the 
disease, who thereby contract herpes at birth. Furthermore, one who has 
the disease should at a minimum refrain from sexual relations while the 
disease is in its active stages. 
312 Md. at 145, 538 A.2d at 1180 (footnote omitted). 
Furthermore, the court recognized the cold reality that a person with genital 
herpes "may be deprived of most normal sexual activity, marriage may be virtually 
out of the question, and vaginal childbearing may be practically ruled out." Id. 
69. Id. at 144-45, 538 A.2d at 1180. 
70. Id. at 147, 538 A.2d at 1181. 
71. Id. at 148, 538 A.2d at 1182 (citing Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 
198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) and Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 
(1985». 
72. 312 Md. at 148-49,538 A.2d at 1182. 
73. Id. (footnote omitted). 
74. The court did make an effort, however, to distinguish transmission of genital herpes 
from "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other triv-
ialities." Id. at 146, 538 A.2d at 1181 (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 
380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977». Thus, the court appears to have continued in its resolve 
to prevent the unbridled application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
75. 312 Md. at 149, 538 A.2d at 1182. 
76. Id. at 150, 538 A.2d at 1182 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 554, 
557A (1977». 
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disease, noting that "concealment cannot be the basis of an action in 
deceit if there is no duty to speak."77 In determining whether a duty 
existed, the court looked to the confidential nature of the relationship 
between Ms. N. and Dr. K.78 
The court refused to conclude that only a marital relationship im-
poses a duty upon a partner to disclose that sexual relations are likely to 
transmit a contagious disease. Instead, the court described the nature of 
a confidential relationship as "whether one party justifiably placed confi-
dence in the other and whether the other accepted the placement."79 
Quoting Kathleen K., Judge Adkins, speaking for the court, stated "a 
certain amount of trust and confidence exists in any intimate relation-
ship. "80 Thus, "an ongoing 'intimate boyfriend-girlfriend relationship' 
may give rise to a duty to speak under circumstances" like those alleged 
by Ms. N.81 
Not only did the court refuse to limit liability to married individu-
als, but also the court dismissed the need for any confidential 
relationship. 
Dr. K. had a general tort duty, at the least, to disclose his con-
dition before engaging in intercourse with [Ms. N.] .... That 
is, whether the relationship between Ms. N. and Dr. K. was 
"confidential" in the eyes of the law or whether it was not, it 
was a relationship which had to make Dr. K. aware that to 
engage in sexual intercourse with Ms. N. without disclosing his 
condition would be highly likely to produce severe harm to a 
readily and clearly identifiable person. 82 
By eliminating the need for a confidential relationship, the court opened 
the door to fraud claims brought by anyone infected by a knowing carrier 
of a dangerous, contagious, and incurable STD such as genital herpes, so 
long as the transmitter could foresee infecting another with the disease. 
Because the certified question presented to the court of appeals in 
B.N v. K.K. was limited to the facts and issues presented in Ms. N.'s 
complaint, the court left unanswered how Maryland courts would treat 
(1) suits brought for the transmission of other STDs such as AIDS, (2) 
intentional tort actions for assault and battery,83 and (3) the applicability 
77. 312 Md. at 151, 538 A.2d at 1183. 
78.Id. 
79.Id. 
80. Id. at 153, 538 A.2d at 1184 (quoting Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 
992, 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (1984». 
81. Id. at 153, 538 A.2d at 1184. 
82. Id. (citation omitted). This statement emphasizes the court's focus on foreseeabil-
ity. It is the relationship as sexual partners between the plaintiff and the defendant 
which makes it foreseeable to the defendant that severe harm may result to the 
plaintiff from sexual intercourse. Therefore, any sexual partner is a foreseeable vic-
tim. The nature of the relationship, beyond the sexual relationship, is immaterial to 
the imposition of liability. 
83. See supra note 46. 
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of the various defenses to both negligence and intentional tort actions for 
transmission of STDs. 
The question presented to the court of appeals was not limited to 
genital herpes; rather it dealt with the "Sexual Transmission Of A Dan-
gerous, Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes."84 
Although the court of appeals was willing to impose liability for the 
transmission of herpes between two heterosexual partners, it is unclear 
how Maryland courts would respond to a suit for transmission of a po-
tentially less visible disease such as AIDS. It is possible that upon a 
showing of intentional conduct, a court easily could apply existing com-
mon law precedent to find a defendant to possess the requisite degree of 
knowledge and intent for liability to be imposed.8s 
More problematic for the courts, however, are negligence cases in 
which the plaintiff has not alleged the defendant's actual knowledge of 
his condition. Instead, a negligence claim may be grounded upon the 
proposition that a reasonable person should have known of his infected 
condition and should have warned his partner of the risks of having sex-
ual relations. 86 Whether the defendant's actions were reasonable is a 
question for the fact finder. 87 
In determining whether a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, it is 
unclear to what extent a court may deem the defendant to possess the 
requisite knowledge. Diseases have various levels of symptomatic indica-
tion, requiring varying levels of investigation to identify their presence. 
A person infected with the AIDS virus may transmit the disease while he 
possesses no physical manifestations. 88 Yet, medical research has shown 
84. 312 Md. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176 (emphasis added). 
85. Actual or implied knowledge by a defendant of his ability to transmit a disease is 
directly tied to his ability to ascertain his infected condition. In many instances, 
physical symptoms are the primary means of gaining such knowledge. 
86. See generally Comment, AIDS Transmission, supra note 14. 
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(d) (1965). The medical facts to be 
weighed in this regard are frequently too complex for a jury to evaluate in the ab-
sence of expert testimony. Even with the aid of expert testimony, uncertainties in 
the medical and scientific communities on the issue of the time between exposure to 
the HIV virus and the date when physical symptoms or even antibodies to the virus 
develop are significant. Compare Friedland, AIDS: General Overview, supra note 4, 
at 681 (time period between exposure to the HTLV-III virus and seroconversion is 
one to six months) with Darrow, Lui & Rutherford, A Model-Based Estimate of the 
Mean Incubation Period for AIDS in Homosexual Men, 240 SCIENCE 1333 (June 3, 
1988) ("the mean incubation period for AIDS in homosexual men is 7.8 years ... , 
which is close to the estimate of 8.2 years for adults developing transfusion-associ-
ated AIDS."). See also Imagawa, et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 
Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegative for Prolonged Periods, 320 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1458 (June I, 1989). Thus, the credibility of the expert will be 
an important ingredient in the jury's determination. 
88. Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 5; see also Haseltine, Silent HIV Infections, 
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1487, 1488 (June I, 1988) (There is "the sobering possibil-
ity that HIV -1 infections may be transmitted by blood and organ donors who are 
silently infected. "). 
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that certain groups are at a higher risk of being infected.89 The question 
of duty, therefore, may hinge on whether a person falling within one of 
these high risk groups possesses the requisite degree of knowledge of his 
potential condition. 90 
It is unclear from the court's opinion in B.N. v. K.K., and from case 
law in other jurisdictions, whether mere high risk activity is sufficient to 
put a defendant on notice that he may be infected with an STD. Com-
mon sense dictates that such activity may be the legal equivalent of a 
physical manifestation of a disease, and thus requires a defendant to 
warn his sexual partner of possible transmission.91 Given the dangerous, 
contagious, and incurable nature of AIDS, and the danger to public 
health, there is no reason why a court, confronted with a claim for tor-
tious transmission of AIDS, should not apply traditional tort concepts in 
the same manner as in genital herpes cases to find a defendant liable. 
In Maryland, a battery is the consummation of an unlawful attempt 
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person or to qause 
an apprehension of such a contact.92 The defendant's intent to do harm 
is not an essential element of battery.93 
A cause of action in battery brought for the transmission of a sexu-
ally communicable disease is problematic due to the consensual nature of 
sexual relations.94 The plaintiff's consent to the initial act of sexual in-
89. Former Surgeon General of the United States, C. Everett Koop, M.D., Sc.D., has 
stated that the following activities constitute "risky behavior": 
Sharing drug needles and syringes. Anal sex, with or without a condom. 
Vaginal or oral sex with someone who shoots drugs or engages in anal sex. 
Sex with someone you don't know well (a pickup or prostitute) or with 
someone you know has several sex partners. Unprotected sex (without a 
condom) with an infected person. 
Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 3. 
90. Whether a sexual partner who is not at high risk and is not infected with an STD 
has a corresponding duty to ask his partner whether the partner is a member of a 
high risk group, or at very least, to request permission to inspect a partner's body 
for signs of STD infection, is an issue which suggests possible contributory negli-
gence, and, in some jurisdictions, comparative negligence. Although these defenses 
may successfully be employed in a given case, discussion of their use is beyond the 
scope of this Note. For a discussion of the issues surrounding both defenses, see 
Comment, AIDS Transmission, supra note 14, at 719; Note, Genital Herpes Trans-
mission, supra note 29, at 529-31. 
91. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
92. Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirable, 52 Md. App. 387, 398, 449 A.2d 1176,1183, 
cert. denied, 294 Md. 652 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 13, 18 (1965). 
93. "The gist of the action is not hostile intent on the part of the defendant, but the 
absence of consent to the contact on the plaintiff's part." Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 52 
Md. App. 31, 38-39, 447 A.2d 84, 88 (1982)(citation omitted). Moreover, "[t]he 
concepts of negligence andbattery are not mutually exclusive." Id. at 40, 447 A.2d 
at 89 (citation omitted). Thus, an individual is not foreclosed from bringing causes 
of action for both battery and negligence. Id. at 42-43, 447 A.2d at 89-90. 
94. Consent to the invasion of the plaintiff's interest usually vitiates the existence of a 
battery because the defendant's act is no longer wrongful. PROSSER ON TORTS, 
supra note 21, at 101. The defendant's privilege is lost, however, if the act to which 
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tercourse, however, should not preclude a subsequent action for battery 
upon ascertaining the true character of the defendant's act, i.e., the trans-
mission of an infectious disease.95 Instead, this problem is avoided by 
"conceptualizing the physical contact between plaintiff and defendant as 
two separate touchings: one, the sexual touching, which was within the 
plaintiff's consent, the other, contamination with the [STD], which was 
not due to the plaintiff's ignorance of the disease."96 Additionally, a de-
fendant's fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with a venereal 
disease may vitiate the plaintiff's consent to sexual intercourse.97 This 
reasoning was applied in Kathleen K. 9~ 
Maryland courts easily can overcome any problems presented by the 
consent defense to a battery action arising from the transmission of an 
STD by following the lead of Kathleen K. By distinguishing the consen-
sual contact of sexual intercourse from the contact resulting in the trans- . 
mission of the venereal disease, Maryland courts can safeguard the public 
health rather than punish the plaintiff for engaging in sexual relations. 
Just as courts impose no duty on a plaintiff to anticipate the negligence of 
the defendant, Maryland courts should not impute consent to a plaintiff 
for infection with a disease absent some readily identifiable signal given 
by the defendant,99 or his condition, that suggests the presence of such a 
riskYlO Upon a proper factual showing, it appears that Maryland courts 
the plaintiff was exposed deviated substantially from the act to which the plaintiff 
originally consented. In such a case, the defendant will be deemed to have exceeded 
the plaintiff's consent. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), 
overruled on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 
(1957); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 118-19. 
95. Closely analogous to the issue of consent in a battery action for the transmission of 
an STD is the doctrine of informed consent. Under that doctrine, the plaintiff typi-
cally alleges that a physician or other health care provider failed to disclose poten-
tial risk, however slight, of a particular procedure, and therefore deprived the 
plaintiff of the opportunity to deny treatment, which he would have done had he 
known of the risk. For an excellent discussion of informed consent, see Sard v. 
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); see also Note, Court of Appeals of Mary-
land Adopts Doctrine of Informed Consent, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 114 (1978). 
Although most jurisdictions treat informed consent cases as negligence actions, 
a minority of courts have allowed recovery upon a battery theory. See generally, 
Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 
YALE L.J. 219 (1985). 
96. Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 511-12, n.114 (citing State v. 
Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 595, 102 A. 63, 64 (1917». 
97. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997,198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 
(1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B, illustration 5 (1979) (Where 
"A consents to sexual intercourse with B, who knows that A is ignorant of the fact 
that B has a venereal disease B is subject to liability to A for battery."); Note, Geni-
tal Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 511-12. 
98. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 997,198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77. 
99. Courts and commentators have not yet expressed an opinion on the scope of "read-
ily identifiable signal" for the purpose of finding a plaintiff contributorily negligent 
in engaging in sexual relations with the defendant. But see supra note 57. 
100. In the context of genital herpes, the presence of open, oozing genital sores may serve 
as a sufficiently reliable signal. See Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 
29, at 514 and accompanying text. An individual infected with AIDS, on the other 
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could implement existing tort principles and the rationale of other juris-
dictions to recognize a cause of action in battery for the transmission of 
any sexually transmitted disease. 101 
In addition to the issues presented by a battery action for transmis-
sion of an STD, the limited nature of the certified question also denied 
the court of appeals the opportunity to address possible defenses to the 
causes of action before it. 102 A defendant may introduce several defenses 
to an action for intentional or negligent transmission of a sexually trans-
mitted disease. A defendant could raise defenses such as assumption of 
the risk, the right of privacy, statute of limitations, implied notice, inter-
spousal immunity, or illegal sexual conduct. 
Assumption of the risk is a defense used by a defendant who alleges 
that the plaintiff, aware of the risk associated with the sexual contact at 
issue, nevertheless proceeded to the plaintiff's detriment. In Maryland, a 
defendant must establish three elements before the plaintiff is deemed to 
have assumed a risk of injury. "The defendant must show that the plain-
tiff (1) had knowledge of the risk of danger, (2) appreciated the risk and 
(3) voluntarily exposed himself to it."103 Upon proof by a defendant that 
the plaintiff assumed the risk, the plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned 
his right to maintain an action. 104 
A primary issue involving the assumption of the risk defense in the 
context of a suit for the transmission of an STD is whether the plaintiff 
possessed the requisite knowledge of the likely effects associated with the 
sexual contact with the defendant. 105 If the defendant can prove that the 
plaintiff was fully aware of the risk, the assumption of risk defense may 
succeed. If, on the other hand, the defendant merely asserts that the 
plaintiff should have known of the existence of the defendant's condition 
and the possibility of being infected, it becomes a question of fact 
whether the plaintiff was in a position whereby he should have recog-
nized the dangerous consequences of contact with the defendant. 
It is questionable whether a defendant successfully can employ the 
implied assumption of risk defense to a negligence action for infliction of 
an STD. Individuals are under no duty to anticipate the negligent con-
duct of others,106 and "[t]he only way such a duty to anticipate could 
hand, may live for several years without any physical manifestations of the infec-
tion. Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 5. 
101. B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. at 139 n.2, 538 A.2d at 1177 n.2 (citing Crowell v. Crowell, 
180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920)). 
102. See supra note 47. 
103. Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630, 495 A.2d 838, 843 (1985) 
(quoting Stancill v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 744 F.2d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(footnote omitted)). 
104. Pfaff v. Yacht Basin Co., 58 Md. App. 348,355-56,473 A.2d 479, 483 (1984) (cita-
tions omitted). 
105. See Comment, Herpes-A Legal Cure-Can the Law Succeed Where Medicine has 
Failed?, 61 J. URB. L. 273, 284-85 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Herpes-A Legal 
Cure]. 
106. Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 530. 
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arise would be if the danger of herpes were widespread and a large seg-
ment of the general public could recognize the physical manifestation of 
a herpetic outbreak."107 
Courts may not take the same approach when confronted with a 
cause of action for the transmission of an STD such as AIDS. Following 
years of constant warnings from the government, medical community, 
and media, members of designated "high risk groups" may find them-
selves unable to claim that they were unaware of the particular risks of 
engaging in high risk activities.108 Furthermore, the present stigma asso-
ciated with AIDS and the socially unacceptable means by which the vi-
rus can be communicated may cause courts to "interfere less" with the 
personal choices of the partners, which, in turn, may cause the courts to 
take a different approach in ruling on the applicability of implied as-
sumption of risk. 
As AIDS becomes more commonplace in the heterosexual commu-
nity,I09 the question remains whether courts will apply implied assump-
tion of risk to cases involving transmission of the AIDS virus between 
non-monogomous heterosexual partners. The relationship between the 
parties is an important factor in defining the risk assumed. I 10 Neverthe-
less, parties to a "one night stand," who arguably expect little from the 
relationship and one another, should be held to the same high duty of 
accountability. The needs of society in protecting itself from the devas-
tating effects of STDs should cause courts to disallow any inference that 
plaintiffs should not expect defendants to act reasonably. 
Genital herpes is one of the more visible venereal diseases. III 
Others such as gonorrhea1l2 and AIDS, however, are less easily identifi-
able, and one infected with either of these diseases may be more likely to 
attribute the symptoms to other, more common causes such as the flu or 
simple skin irritation. l13 This gives rise to the more fundamental ques-
tion of whether any physical symptom suggesting possible infection with 
a communicable disease creates a duty on the part of the defendant to 
107.Id. 
108. See generally Understanding AIDS, supra note 5; see also supra note 89. 
109. See generally MMWR HIV Infection in the u.s., supra note 2, at 344. 
110. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 481. 
Ill. But see Wheeler, The Herpes Simplex Problem, supra note 2, at 163, "[A] significant 
percentage of persons who have seropositive results for herpes simplex virus are not 
aware of having had clinical herpetic infections. Their infections have been either 
asymptomatic or subclinical, not diagnosed, ignored, or misdiagnosed." 
112. Gonorrhea is a contagious viral infection producing symptoms in the genital mu-
cous membranes of men and women. The typical male symptoms include discharge 
from the penis and painful urination. In women, the labia and urethral canal be-
come irritated and tender. The most profound symptoms may appear shortly after 
infection and then subside. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY G-29 to 
G-30 (lith ed. 1970). Even upon dissipation of symptoms, an individual may re-
main infectious for several weeks. Id. 
113. Symptoms commonly associated with AIDS Related Complex (ARC), a condition 
where the HIV antibody is present in the blood but where the symptoms associated 
with full blown AIDS are absent, can be as mild as a slight temperature, diarrhea, 
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warn a partner of the possibility that the symptoms are linked to an 
STD.114 
A defendant faced with a suit for transmission of an STD also may 
assert a right to privacy as a defense. The right to privacy protects indi-
viduals from unwarranted government intrusion into their personal 
lives. lls Although defendants sued in tort for transmitting an STD have 
asserted the right to privacy defense, courts consistently have denied its 
sufficiency on the ground that while "the constitutional right to privacy 
normally shields sexual relations from judicial scrutiny, it does not do so 
where the right to privacy is used as a shield from liability at the expense 
of the other party." I 16 Other courts reason that public policy considera-
tions of community health outweigh the privacy interest that may be vio-
lated. 117 In light of the court of appeals' rationale for placing liability on 
the defendant in B.N. v. K.K., it is probable that Maryland courts would 
deny the use of a right to privacy defense in favor of more fundamental 
considerations of public health and welfare. 118 
A defense that invariably may present itself for use in tort actions is 
the running of the statute of limitations. The issues surrounding the stat-
ute of limitations defense are as problematic in the context of sexually 
transmitted diseases as they are in medical malpractice and products lia-
bility actions involving toxic drugs or chemicals, in which the statute of 
limitations may run even before the defendant becomes aware of the in-
jury inflicted upon him.119 In Maryland, as in many other states, a plain-
tiff alleging personal injury arising out of the tortious conduct of another 
generally must bring suit within three years of the injurious conduct. 12o 
The defendant's successful use of the statute of limitations defense 
will depend upon which theory the court relies on to start the running of 
weight loss, and swollen glands. Friedland, AIDS: General Overview, supra note 4, 
at 682. 
A first episode of genital herpes is characterized by "fever, headache, malaise, 
and myalgias. Pain, itching, dysuria, vaginal and urethral discharge . . . are the 
predominant local symptoms." Infections with HSV (Part II.), supra note 3, at 750; 
see also Comment, Herpes: Liability to Third Parties, supra note 14, at 795-96. 
114. One commentator takes the argument one step further and proposes that an infected 
individual who warns his partner of the danger of contracting an STD, but fails to 
explain to his partner the potential health consequences of the disease, should be 
deemed negligent in failing to advise in this regard. Comment, Herpes-A Legal 
Cure, supra note 105, at 284-85. 
115. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
116. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 385, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 433 (1983). 
117. R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (those afflicted with 
sexually communicable diseases are in the best position to prevent their spread, and 
the public's interest in preventing the spread of incurable diseases justifies some in-
vasion into personal privacy); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996-
97, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984). 
118. For further discussion of the issues surrounding the right to privacy in the context 
ofSTDs, see Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law, supra note 15, at 138-39; Note, 
Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 531-32. 
119. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 165-68. 
120. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984). 
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the statute. Some jurisdictions hold firm to the rule that the statute of 
limitations begins to run at the time of the negligent act or omission, 
which in the context of the transmission of an STD is the sexual contact 
itself. 
In jurisdictions following the discovery rule, the statute will not be-
gin to run until the plaintiff either knew or should have known of the 
defendant's negligent conduct. Although there is no written opinion dis-
cussing the applicability of a statute of limitations defense to an action 
for the transmission of a venereal disease, there is ample common law 
precedent addressing the statute of limitations issues in other contexts to 
justify a court's application of the discovery rule in an STD case.t21 
The statute of limitations should not present a serious problem in an 
action for transmission of genital herpes, since physical symptoms of 
HSV infection manifest themselves within a short time after initial expo-
sure. 122 In AIDS transmission cases, however, it is quite possible that 
physical symptoms will not manifest themselves for many years. Several 
scientific studies suggest that the time between the date of initial HIV 
exposure and the date symptoms appear which are significant enough for 
an individual to suspect that he has AIDS can range from four and one 
half to eight years. 123 Also unresolved is the question whether the pres-
ence of HIV antibodies, without actual manifestation of physical symp-
toms, constitutes sufficient injury to commence the running of the statute 
of limitations. 124 It is plausible that mere knowledge of the presence of 
the antibody in one's blood is sufficient notice that a partner's negligence 
was the source of exposure. 125 
121. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 167 nn. 23-24. 
122. "The incubation period [for HSV] ranges from I to 26 days (median 6 to 8 days)." 
Corey & Spear, Infections with Herpes Simplex Viruses (Part II.), 314 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 686, 690 (March 13, 1986). At least one study suggests, however, that the 
herpes simplex virus cervicitis, which afflicts a large portion of women with HSV-II 
of the external genitalia, can be transmitted through vaginal excretion "without evi-
dence of genital lesions." Corey, Adams, Brown & Holmes, Genital Herpes Simplex 
Virus Infections: Clinical Manifestations, Course, and Complications, 98 ANNALS 
OF INTERNAL MED. 958, 961 (1983). 
123. Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 278, 278 (July 30, 1987); but see supra note 87. Although the HIV 
antibody may develop in the blood much sooner than the appearance of physical 
symptoms, it is questionable whether a plaintiff would have the requisite knowledge 
of his exposure in the absence of conclusive test results. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 
N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
124. One commentator has suggested that the presence of the HIV antibodies is sufficient 
to constitute an actionable injury, and that the development of full-blown AIDS is 
not necessary. Comment, AIDS Transmission, supra note 14, at 715-16. One can 
draw analogies from this reasoning to support a contention that the seroconversion 
is an injury for the purpose of commencing the running of the statute of limitations. 
125. Id. As courts expand the gamut of actionable wrongs, the plaintiff must remain 
keenly aware that sustaining even the slightest injury may commence the running of 
the statute of limitations. A plaintiff infected with HIV, who has not developed the 
physical symptoms associated with AIDS, may suffer emotional damage upon learn-
ing of his infected condition out of fear that the full effects of the disease will inevita-
bly develop. In an analogous context, courts in several jurisdictions have allowed 
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One theory upon which a defendant may rely to negate tort liability 
on limitations grounds is that of implied notice of infection. Similar to 
an implied assumption of risk defense,126 the defendant alleges that the 
prevalence of STDs in the United States, and more specifically, in a par-
ticular city,127 constitutes sufficient notice to an individual involved in 
non-monagomous sexual relations of the possibility of becoming infected 
with a venereal disease. A homosexual defendant who infects a partner 
may argue that the plaintiff was implicitly aware of the high risk of infec-
tion at the time of sexual contact because homosexual activity is known 
to be "risky behavior."128 It remains to be seen whether courts are will-
ing to preclude recovery for a partner's tortious conduct by imputing 
such knowledge of infection to the plaintiff. 
For many years, the doctrine of interspousal immunity precluded 
liability of one spouse for the intentional or negligent infliction of harm 
to the other spouse. 129 In Crowell v. Crowell,130 the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina summed up the rationale behind allowing interspousal 
suits for transmission of an STD when it stated: 
Many laws have become obsolete, even when not changed by 
statute and the Constitution, as this has been, and no principle 
of justice can maintain the proposition in law, or in morals, that 
a debauchee, as the defendant admits himself to be can marry a 
virtuous girl, and, continuing his round of dissipation, keep up 
his intercourse with lewd women, contracting, as he admits, ve-
nereal disease, communicate it to his wife ... SUbjecting her to 
humiliation, and ruining her physically for life, ... yet be ex-
recovery for fear of future health effects related to exposure to toxic chemicals. See 
Herber v. Johns-ManviIIe Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (recovery allowed for 
fear of contracting asbestosis despite absence of physical injury); see generally 
Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pan-
dora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (1984). 
In the context of HIV infection, the fear of future adverse health effects may be 
that full-blown AIDS will develop. Baruch, AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for 
the Sexual Transmission of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 165, 173 (1987). In genital herpes cases, the fear of future adverse health effects 
may be the fear associated with the increased risk of developing cervical cancer. 
Chuang, Daniel, Perry, Ilstrup & Kurland, Incidence and Trend of Herpes 
Progenitalis: A J5-Year Population Study, 58 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 436, 440 (July 
1983); see also supra note 68. 
126. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. 
127. According to a 1987 report of the Centers for Disease Control, "the prevalence of 
HIV antibody among intravenous (IV) drug users varies markedly by geographic 
region." The report, which incorporates the results of 90 independent studies in 53 
cities across the United States, concludes that HIV infection among IV drug users 
"range[s] from 50% to 60% in New York City, northern New Jersey, and Puerto 
Rico to predominantly below 5% in most areas of the country other than the East 
Coast." MMWR HIV Infection in the u.s., supra note 2, at 2. 
128. See supra note 89. 
129. For a discussion of the history and current state of the law on interspousal immu-
nity, see generally Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983). 
130. 180 N.C. 516, 523, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920). 
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empted from all liability by the assertion that he and his wife 
are one, and that ... he owes no duty to her of making repara-
tion .... 
633 
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland abrogated the 
doctrine of interspousal immunity in suits for outrageous intentional 
torts 131 and negligence actions,132 and the Maryland General Assembly 
sealed the fate of interspousal immunity by providing that a married wo-
man may sue her husband for any tort committed against her. 133 In light 
of existing law, a defendant cannot successfully make use of the inter-
spousal immunity defense. 
Also related to implied assumption of risk in cases involving trans-
mission of STDs such as herpes and AIDS is the theory that a court 
should not impose liability for transmission of a disease contracted dur-
ing illegal sexual conduct. 134 Courts more frequently are imposing liabil-
ity for transmission of disease between unmarried persons,135 and 
legislatures are modifying and repealing statutes prohibiting fornication 
and adultery.136 However, Maryland has not legalized such "risky be-
havior" as sodomy,137 oral sex,138 prostitution,139 or intravenous drug 
use. 140 
Early cases involving transmission of STDs evidenced courts' un-
willingness to impose liability on a defendant for negligence arising from 
"immoral" sexual conduct. 141 In recent years, however, courts have . 
minimized the illegality defense, at least where the illegal conduct alleged 
by the defendant is premarital sexual relations. 142 While the decision in 
B.N. v. K.K. demonstrates the court of appeals' conformance with ex-
131. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); see also Note, Maryland Abro-
gates Interspousal Immunity in Cases o/Outrageous Intentional Torts, 8 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 584 (1979). 
132. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983). 
133. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-204(7) (1984); see also Note, Maryland Abrogates 
Interspousal Immunity in Negligence Cases, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 390 (1984). 
134. See Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law, supra note 15, at 135-36. 
135. See, e.g., Kathleen K., 150 Cal App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). But see 
Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 382 n.17, 430 A.2d 570,579 n.17 (1981) for a discus-
sion of state regulation of sexual conduct of unmarried adults. 
136. See Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law, supra note 15, at 137 n.213. 
137. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 553 (1987). 
138. See, e.g., id. § 554. 
139. See, e.g., id. § 15(g). 
140. See, e.g., id. § 276. 
141. Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317,55 P. 656 (1898). In Deeds, a woman, believing her-
self to be divorced from her first husband, remarried, contracted a venereal disease 
from her second husband, and brought suit. After suit was filed, the defendant dis-
covered the plaintiff was not legally divorced, and he asserted illegality as a defense 
to the plaintiff's suit. The court agreed with the defendant's asserted defense and 
dismissed the plaintiff's action because the injury "could scarcely have arisen but 
for the iIlegal relations existing between the parties .... " /d. at 323, 55 P. at 658. 
142. But see Zysk v. Zysk, - Va. -, 387 S.E.2d 466 (1990) (holding that because forni-
cation is illegal, one may not receive damages for herpes resulting from participating 
in the act of fornication). 
634 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
isting precedent in other jurisdictions, it is unclear how Maryland courts 
will deal with transmission of STDs through illegal conduct such as in-
travenous drug use and homosexual activity. The limits of socially ac-
cepted behavior may influence the limits of the illegality defense. 
In B.N. v. K.K., the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized 
causes of action for negligence, fraud, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resulting from the sexual transmission of a dangerous, con-
tagious, and incurable disease such as genital herpes. Through its 
holding in B.N. v. K.K., the court of appeals has brought Maryland law 
in line with that of the majority of jurisdictions confronted with similar 
issues of liability for the transmission of STDs. 
Given the ever increasing health problems posed by the growing 
number of Maryland citizens infected with STDs, including AIDS, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, upon a proper factual showing, Maryland 
courts would apply the same legal principles applied in B.N. v. K.K. to 
similar actions for assault and battery and for the transmission of AIDS. 
In the meantime, citizens can feel more secure that recompense will be 
afforded to those affected by irresponsible sexual behavior. 
Glen P. Smith 
